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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we provide mathematical formulations for and investigate a
number of problems that arise in the security of some emerging wireless
technologies. First, we address the problem of secure communication be-
tween secondary users (SUs) and their serving base station in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers and multiple primary users (PUs) in cognitive radio
networks. We analyze the interactions between the SUs and eavesdroppers
using the framework of noncooperative game theory. Assuming that the
SUs have full knowledge of the eavesdroppers, we propose a novel secure
channel selection algorithm that enables the SUs and eavesdroppers to take
distributed decisions so as to reach a Nash equilibrium point. Then, we
solve the same problem using a different approach and under a different set
of assumptions. Here, the SUs aim at mitigating the effect of eavesdrop-
ping by changing their positions using only partial information about the
locations of the eavesdroppers. Accordingly, for each SU, we propose an ap-
propriate utility function and then maximize the social welfare of all SUs
without interfering with the PUs’ radio receivers and taking into account
the interference thresholds set by the PUs on each channel. Given these
constraints, we formulate the problem so as to optimize the social welfare
of all SUs and we present three different algorithms to solve the emerging
constrained optimization problem, depending on the possible communication
links and the available information. Finally, we investigate the problem of
placing small cell base stations (SCBSs) in adversarial heterogeneous wire-
less networks. We consider a continuum of wireless users facing three types
of attacks: eavesdropping, jamming and a combination of both. For each
attack, we propose a suitable utility function for the wireless users. Then,
we propose a novel optimal placement algorithm for finding the optimal loca-
tions of the SCBSs given the underlying security considerations. Simulations
were carried out for all the proposed algorithms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Security in Emerging Wireless Technologies
The demand for wireless services has grown exponentially in the past decade
and is expected to continue to do so in the foreseeable future [1]. This growth
was accompanied by an increase in the number of wireless users and higher
traffic rates, thus straining the current wireless cellular system. To address
these challenges, researchers have been developing new paradigms in network
design. Hence, emerging wireless technologies, such as cognitive radio (CR)
and small cell networks, were introduced to boost the efficiency and spatial
utilization of the radio spectrum [2–7].
The increase in mobile traffic, the broadcast nature of the wireless medium
and the sensitivity of the data being sent render the wireless network vulner-
able to security attacks. According to recent studies, more wireless mobile
users were targeted over the past few years causing security concerns and ser-
vice outages [8]. These increasing threats have caught the attention of service
providers, who are recently introducing new security measures to target these
problems [8].
Accordingly, it is of paramount importance to address the security aspects
of the emerging wireless technologies. But, with the evolution of mobile and
decentralized networks, implementing traditional cryptographic techniques
over large-scale wireless systems is becoming an increasingly complex task
due to the associated computational overhead, especially in a resource con-
strained environment. Recently, physical layer (PHY) security has emerged
as a promising solution for securing communication over the wireless medium.
PHY security was first introduced in Wyner’s seminal work [9] over the
wire-tap channel and it was then extended to wireless and multi-user chan-
nels [10–12]. The main idea behind PHY security is to exploit the wireless
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channel characteristics, such as noise and fading, so as to improve the reliabil-
ity of wireless transmission. This reliability is quantified through the notion
of secrecy rate, which is defined as the rate of secret information sent from a
node to its destination without being tapped in by malicious eavesdroppers.
1.2 Cognitive Radio Networks
The use of PHY security is of great importance for emerging cognitive radio
networks. In a CR network, a number of distributed, often ad hoc, unli-
censed secondary users (SUs) are able to transmit over the licensed radio
spectrum, when the associated channels are not being utilized by licensed
primary users (PUs) [3]. The decentralized nature of CR networks and the
increasing volume of wireless attacks and attackers introduce numerous se-
curity threats to the communicating SUs [13–17]. For example, the authors
in [13] discuss how the SUs can help increase the secrecy of the PU transmis-
sions by appropriately choosing the channels and power levels. They model
the interactions between the SUs and PUs as a Stackelberg game. The au-
thors in [14] investigate denial-of-service attacks against CR networks and
introduce a few potential protection remedies. In [15], a study of primary
user emulation attacks is presented. The authors analyze the equilibrium
of a game between malicious and legitimate SUs. Another type of attack
was considered in [16] where the authors address the problem of compro-
mised SUs reporting false spectrum sensing results. The authors provide a
solution technique to detect malicious SUs by assigning suspicious levels to
each node. A comprehensive survey of CR attacks and countermeasures is
presented in [17].
One important aspect of CR is spectrum sharing whereby SUs must choose
their preferred channel for access depending on the tradeoff between channel
availability and the mutual interference resulting from the choices of other
SUs. The problem of spectrum sharing was extensively studied in the liter-
ature [18–20]. For example, the authors in [18] propose a cooperative game
for distributed spectrum sharing, while the authors in [19] propose a nonco-
operative solution for dynamic spectrum access. A list of spectrum sharing
techniques is given in [20].
As the SUs are utilizing the CR network to transmit more sensitive and
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important data, the presence of active or passive threats constitutes a major
concern for SUs, affecting their decision making process. Despite the wealth
of existing works on security in cognitive radio networks [17], little has been
done to address how the potential presence of eavesdroppers and the quality-
of-service demands of the PUs can affect the choices of the SUs. In particular,
in this thesis, we will first analyze how the SUs’ need to optimize their secrecy
rates, in the presence of eavesdroppers, affects the spectrum sharing process.
This becomes more challenging when addressing both the spectrum sharing
and the security aspects of the problem. In that case, the SUs must observe
various parameters such as PUs’ activity, mutual interference, and any po-
tential or suspected eavesdropping, before choosing the transmission channel.
Here, we assume that the SUs have complete knowledge of the eavesdroppers.
Secondly, we will consider the case of mobile SUs who need to ensure a fast
and secure communication link with the base station (BS) in the presence of
eavesdroppers. By changing their positions before transmission, the SUs aim
at mitigating the effect of potential eavesdropping using only partial infor-
mation about the positions of eavesdroppers. To our knowledge, no previous
work seems to have investigated how this potential presence of eavesdroppers
can impact the channel selection and movement strategies of the SUs in a
cognitive network.
1.3 Small Cell Networks
Another propitious emerging wireless technology is small cell networks. Small
cell networks, also known as heterogeneous networks, are seen as a promising
solution for the growing demand in mobile cellular systems. Small cells are
based on the deployment of low power, low cost, small cell base stations that
are overlaid over cellular networks. There are multiple types of small cells,
each having its unique set of features that identifies its role in the network.
On the one hand, femtocells are small, user-deployed indoor access points
used to provide extra coverage in houses or small businesses. On the other
hand, picocells and microcells are larger, operator-deployed outdoor stations
used by network operators to boost network capacity in high traffic areas.
Small cells are becoming very popular, and according to recent reports, over
six million small cells were deployed by the end of 2012 [21]. This surpasses
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the overall number of deployed macrocells at 5.9 million worldwide. The
market forecast also predicts that, by the end of 2016, there will be around
91 million small cells deployed globally [21].
For the operator-deployed picocells and microcells, optimally placing the
small cell base stations (SCBSs) is vital to reap the benefits of small cell
networks. Indeed, deploying SCBSs so as to optimize the overall quality-
of-service of the wireless users is a key problem. Remarkably, little work
seems to have investigated the network planning problem in the presence of
small cells. Most of the existing network planning works have been focused
on the deployment of conventional macro-cellular base stations [22–25]. For
example, the authors in [24] consider the problem of optimally placing two
base stations on a line to maximize the signal to interference plus noise ra-
tio (SINR) of wireless users. The authors study the hierarchical equilibrium
to conclude the optimal placement of base stations. The work was limited
to the study of two base stations on the real line. The authors in [25] ad-
dress the problem of heterogeneous base station deployment. They study
how deploying additional SCBSs into existing networks can boost the energy
efficiency of traditional macrocell deployment.
Particularly, as small cells can be massively deployed and practically any-
where, their transmission becomes more susceptible to security threats. The
broadcast nature of the wireless medium renders heterogeneous networks vul-
nerable to different types of attacks. To address such threats, the authors
in [26] consider the problem of the secure placement of relays in general
wireless networks under eavesdropping attacks. Using physical layer security
techniques, the authors formulate the problem with a single sender and a
single receiver without the relay. The relay is then optimally placed in the
network to maximize the secrecy rate of users. The work in [27] takes a
different approach to evade jammers in heterogeneous mobile networks. The
problem is formulated as a zero-sum pursuit-evasion game and its saddle
point equilibrium is studied.
Non-secure SCBS deployment techniques do not account for potential secu-
rity threats in the network. These techniques will provide the attackers with
better network resources and may end up favoring them over the wireless
users. Therefore, accounting for potential attacks before placing the SCBSs
improves the security of the network. The work in [24] can be used to opti-
mally place small cells, but it only considers two base stations, is restricted
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to a linear system, and does not account for potential security threats. Also,
the works in [26,27] can be helpful in targeting jamming and eavesdropping
attacks in heterogeneous networks, but they do not treat the deployment
problem. In this thesis, we consider the problem of optimally placing SCBSs
given underlying security considerations. This problem is particularly chal-
lenging as the placement of SCBSs has to accommodate both the quality
of user channels and the potential security threats at different points in the
network. In addition, the placement problem has to change the techniques
used in order to accommodate each potential threat.
To this end, we focus on two key physical layer attacks on small cell net-
works: eavesdropping and jamming, as they constitute a major threat in
next-generation decentralized heterogeneous systems [28–31]. For example,
such security threats are common in military networks, in which the deploy-
ment of small cells can boost the network’s efficiency. Due to the confiden-
tiality and importance of the military data being transmitted, accounting
for potential jamming and eavesdropping threats should be considered when
placing the SCBSs or other similar wireless access points. Also, as mobile
payment systems are becoming popular, more sensitive and secure data is be-
ing sent from mobile devices very frequently. Accordingly, protection against
eavesdropping in mobile communication is of central importance. In addi-
tion, the proliferation of denial of service and jamming attacks coupled with
the need for providing higher wireless data rates implies that the protection
of wireless transmission against jamming is of paramount importance. To our
knowledge, no previous work seems to have investigated how this potential
presence of eavesdroppers and jammers can affect the placement of SCBSs
in a heterogeneous network.
1.4 Main Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is to address how the potential presence
of security threats affects the design of emerging cognitive radio and small cell
networks. In particular, we start by looking at a CR network being attacked
by a set of eavesdroppers. Each of these eavesdroppers can only wiretap
one channel at a time. In this scenario, we introduce a novel scheme which
enables the SUs to strategically decide on their preferred secure communica-
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tion channel, given complete knowledge of the eavesdroppers. To this end,
we formulate a noncooperative game between the SUs and the eavesdroppers.
This game consists of two levels of competition. On the one hand, the SUs
need to choose their preferred channel so as to optimize the tradeoff between
interference (due to channel congestion), availability (due to PUs’ activity)
and secrecy rate (due to the potential of being eavesdropped). On the other
hand, the eavesdroppers are strategic and need to choose the channels that
enable them to minimize the overall network’s secrecy rate. We first study
several properties of this game and characterize the resulting equilibrium.
Then, we propose a distributed, low-complexity learning algorithm that can
be adopted by the SUs and the eavesdroppers so as to reach an equilibrium of
the game. Using simulations, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm
and show that it yields significant performance improvements, in terms of
the average secrecy rate per SU, compared to classical schemes.
Secondly, we consider a more complex eavesdropping model. We assume
that eavesdroppers are spread over a set of areas and they can simultaneously
eavesdrop on all channels in a CR network. In this scenario, we introduce a
novel approach that enables the SUs to evade potential eavesdroppers with-
out knowing their exact locations. To this end, we develop a novel model
that accounts for eavesdropping while protecting the PU receiver radio from
SU transmissions and accommodating for the interference thresholds set by
the PUs on each channel. In particular, we study the problem of how mo-
bile SUs can change their positions before sending their messages in order to
boost the secrecy of their transmission link. To solve this problem, we first
propose an appropriate utility function that incorporates the key aspects of
the system such as secrecy, movement costs, and time delay. Then, we pro-
pose algorithms to solve the problem in three different scenarios. In the first
scenario, the BS has all the information about the SU utilities. Here, we cast
the problem as a general assignment problem (GAP) and study its solution.
In the second scenario, the BS does not possess the information about SUs.
Here, the communicating SUs use a distributed game theoretic approach to
arrive at the solution. In the third scenario, we consider the case in which the
BS has no information about SUs and the SUs are unable to communicate
with one another. Here, we introduce a Lagrangian heuristic algorithm to
find the solution. Extensive simulation results are run to assess the perfor-
mance of the proposed approaches. These results show that the proposed
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decentralized algorithms were able to achieve near-optimal performances.
Finally, we look at how the operator of a small cell network can choose the
locations of SCBSs in order to boost the performance and secrecy of the user
transmissions in the presence of security threats. Particularly, we study the
problem of optimally placing SCBSs while jointly addressing three key secu-
rity considerations: (a) eavesdropping, (b) jamming, and (c) a combination
of both attacks. For each case, we propose a novel small cell base station
placement algorithm that optimally places the SCBSs so as to optimize the
overall performance and reliability of the users’ wireless transmission as cap-
tured by both quality-of-service and security considerations. For each attack,
we study and analyze the network structure, develop suitable utility func-
tions, formulate the secure placement problem, and finally solve it using the
proposed optimal placement algorithm. We then simulate the proposed al-
gorithms for different network structures, and compare the obtained results
with non-secure placement techniques. Simulation results show that the pro-
posed approaches can mitigate the effect of potential security threats and
enhance the performance of wireless users for all the considered attacks.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the
security of SU transmissions in adversarial CR networks with complete and
partial knowledge of eavesdroppers, respectively. Chapter 4 discusses the
optimal deployment of wireless SCBSs with security considerations. Finally,
conclusions and future works are drawn in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
CR NETWORK SECURITY: PERFECT
KNOWLEDGE
In this chapter, we discuss the interactions between the SUs in CR networks
in the presence of potential eavesdropping threats [32].
Here, we consider that the locations of both SUs and eavesdroppers are
known for all the others in the network. This is commonly assumed in most
physical layer security related literature such as in [10,11] and the references
therein. In practice, this can be used to model a variety of scenarios. For
example, this could correspond to a case in which SUs suspect the presence
of eavesdroppers at a specific predetermined location (such as in the case of
a battlefield). This model is also applicable to a network in which the eaves-
droppers are not malicious, but rather are legitimate SUs. In such a case, the
studied model applies to situations in which some messages are not intended
for all nodes of the network, such as when some content is “premium” and
should be received only by those who have paid for it (legitimate receivers)
while others (eavesdroppers) should be denied access. Generally, it is always
possible for eavesdroppers to approximate the locations of SUs by sensing
the power of the received signals [33].
To this end, we formulate a noncooperative game between the SUs and the
eavesdroppers and study its solutions. This chapter is organized as follows:
in Section 2.1, we introduce the system model and describe the game formu-
lation, and in Section 2.2, we provide the proposed game solution. Simulation
results are then analyzed in Section 2.3.
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2.1 System Model and Game Formulation
2.1.1 System Model
Consider a cognitive radio network composed of a setM of M licensed PUs
or channels which can be accessed by a setN of N unlicensed SUs, when they
are not used for PU transmission. The objective of each SU is to communicate
with a common BS by using one of the available PU channels. To model the
activity of the primary users, we assume that each channel m ∈ M has a
probability θm of being available, i.e., not being used by its corresponding
PU.
We consider a frequency selective Rayleigh fading channel such that the
channel gain experienced by SU i on channel m ∈ M at the BS is given
by hi,m = καmd
−µ
i . Here, µ and κ denote the path loss exponent and the
path loss constant, respectively. The term αm represents the Rayleigh fading
amplitude on channel m, while di represents the distance between SU i and
the BS. In this chapter, we consider a slowly varying channel with a long
coherence time.
In essence, the SUs are interested in choosing the channel that provides the
highest transmission rate. Since SUs share the available spectrum, mutual
interference occurs when more than one SU chooses the same channel. The
SINR perceived by an SU i when transmitting over a channel m is:
γi,m =
hi,mPi,m
σ2 +
∑
j∈Nm\{i}
hj,mPj,m
, (2.1)
where Pi,m is the maximum transmit power of SU i on channel m, σ
2 is
the variance of the Gaussian noise, and Nm is the set of SUs that are using
channel m for transmission.
The capacity achieved by an SU i over an available channel m is thus given
by:
Cmi = log(1 + γi,m), (2.2)
where γi,m is the SINR achieved by SU i on channel m as per (2.1). The
capacity Cmi is set to zero if the channel m is not available.
In this model, each SU chooses the channel which optimizes its capacity at
the BS. Now, consider that a set K of K eavesdroppers is present in the net-
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work. Here, we consider practical, inexpensive eavesdropping devices which
often have limited hardware and can only eavesdrop on a limited number
of channels as discussed in [34–36]. We consider in this chapter the case
in which an eavesdropper chooses only one channel at a time to eavesdrop
on. In the presence of eavesdroppers, the SUs aim not only to maximize
their capacity, but also to choose a channel that can potentially lead to se-
cure communication. To this end, each SU will choose the available channel
which can yield the highest secrecy rate. This leads to a competitive environ-
ment between the SUs, as well as between SUs and eavesdroppers. On the
one hand, SUs compete to gain access to the available channels in order to
maximize their secrecy rates. On the other hand, the objective of the eaves-
droppers is to reduce the secrecy rate of the overall network, or a subset of
SUs which they are interested in, by choosing their optimal channels. Here,
we consider the case in which eavesdroppers want to reduce the overall social
welfare of the network. Certainly, our approach can also accommodate other
eavesdropping models. For example, with some minor changes, one can also
consider adjunct cases such as the one in which the eavesdropper attempts
to minimize the secrecy of a certain selected SU (e.g., the weakest).
Given a set Km of eavesdroppers active on a channel m, the secrecy rate
achieved by an SU i is given by:
C˜mi =
(
Cmi − max
k∈Km
Cmi,k
)+
, (2.3)
where a+ := max(a, 0) and Cmi is given by (2.2). C
m
i,k is the capacity of
channel m between SU i and eavesdropper k as received by k and is given
by:
Cmi,k = log
1 + gi,k,mPi,m
σ2 +
∑
j∈Nm\{i}
gj,k,mPj,m
 , (2.4)
where gi,k,m = καmd
−µ
i,k represents the channel gain between SU i and any
eavesdropper k ∈ K where di,k is the distance between i and k.
It is clear from (2.3) that both channel congestion and eavesdropping de-
crease the overall secrecy rate of secondary users. Consequently, when an SU
tries to maximize its secrecy rate in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers,
there is an obvious tradeoff between choosing a crowded channel with better
10
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Figure 2.1: A typical system with N = 6 SUs and K = 4 eavesdroppers
and M = 3 channels.
secrecy versus a less crowded one with more damaging eavesdroppers. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows a typical system in which the SUs and eavesdroppers interact
in a CR network with three channels in the presence of four eavesdroppers.
2.1.2 Game Formulation
We use the framework of noncooperative game theory to study the interac-
tions between SUs and eavesdroppers [37]. This problem is game theoretic
by nature since both SUs and eavesdroppers want to selfishly maximize their
gains.
Denote by P = N ⋃K the set of all players in this game, that is the set of
SUs and eavesdroppers in the network. Players in P choose their actions from
the same action space Mi =M ∀i ∈ P of size M representing the channels
in the system. The action mi ∈ Mi of an SU i represents the channel it
chooses to transmit on, while the action ek ∈ Mk of an eavesdropper k
represents the channel it chooses to listen on. In this section, we define the
capacities as functions of the channels, i.e., Ci(m) := C
m
i , Ci,k(m) := C
m
i,k
and C˜i(m) := C˜
m
i .
We define the utility of the secondary users as the expected value, with
11
respect to the PUs’ activity, of the achieved secrecy rate, expressed in (2.3),
when choosing a certain channel. Formally, the utility of an SU i ∈ N that
selects an action mi ∈Mi is given by:
φ(mi,m−i, e) = E
[
C˜i(mi)
]
,
= θmi
(
Ci(mi)− max{k∈K:ek=mi}Ci,k(mi)
)+
. (2.5)
Here, m−i represents the vector of all actions taken by all other SUs in the
set N \{i}, and e represents the vector of actions taken by all eavesdroppers
in K. Each SU aims at maximizing its achieved secrecy rate by choosing the
channel that maximizes its utility function.
The utility of each eavesdropper is captured by its ability to decrease the
secrecy rates of the SUs. Formally, the utility of an eavesdropper k ∈ K
that chooses an action ek ∈Mk is given by the expected value, with respect
to the PUs’ activity, of its eavesdropping effect on all SUs transmitting on
channel ek. Using (2.4), the utility is given by:
ψ(ek,m) = θek
( ∑
i∈N :ek=mk
Ci,k(ek)
)
. (2.6)
Here, m represents the vector of actions taken by all SUs in N . Clearly, the
eavesdroppers are mainly competing with the SUs, but not with one another.
Each eavesdropper aims at maximizing its utility in order to increase the
damage that it inflicts on the SUs.
Generally, let ai ∈Mi be the action of player i ∈ P , i.e., ai = mi if i ∈ N
and ai = ei if i ∈ K. Let a−i be the vector of actions taken by all players in
the set P \ {i}. Given the SUs’ and eavesdroppers’ utilities as expressed by
(2.5) and (2.6), respectively, we define the general utility function as follows:
Ui(ai,a−i) =
{
φ(mi,m−i, e) if i ∈ N
ψ(ei,m) if i ∈ K
(2.7)
Now, let pi =
[
p1i , p
2
i , · · · , pMi
] ∈ Λi be the mixed strategy of player i ∀i ∈
P . Each component pmi can be viewed as the frequency with which player i
transmits on channel m, if i ∈ N , or eavesdrops on channel m, if i ∈ K. In
other words, pmi := Pr(ai = m). Λi represents the space of all possible mixed
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strategies for player i and it is defined as Λi :=
{
pi ∈ [0, 1]M |
∑
m∈Mi p
m
i = 1
}
.
Let p = {pi, i ∈ P}; then, the expected utility of player i is given by
U¯i(pi,p−i) = Ep[Ui(ai,a−i)]
=
∑
a1∈M1
· · ·
∑
aN+K∈MN+K
Ui(a1, · · · , aN+K)
N+K∏
j=1
p
aj
j , (2.8)
where p−i represents the vector of mixed strategies of all other players in
P \ {i}.
We now formulate a noncooperative game Γ = {P ,Mi{i∈P}, Ui{i∈P}} be-
tween N SUs and K eavesdroppers in the presence of M PUs. Our objective
is to study and analyze the outcome from these interactions.
2.2 Game Solution
Here, we investigate the solution of the proposed finite noncooperative game
Γ between SUs and eavesdroppers. In this chapter, we will use the term
“player” to denote either an SU or an eavesdropper, unless an explicit dis-
tinction is needed.
2.2.1 Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies and Fictitious
Play
As a solution for the proposed game Γ, we use the concept of mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. A mixed strategy profile p∗ = (p∗i ,p
∗
−i) is said to be a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) if and only if it satisfies the following set
of inequalities
U¯i(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) ≥ U¯i(pi,p∗−i) ∀pi ∈ Λi ∀i ∈ P . (2.9)
The above definition implies that, whenever an MSNE is attained, no
player has the incentive to unilaterally deviate and change its probability of
channel selection. In other words, none of the SUs is capable of generating a
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higher secrecy rate by unilaterally altering its current probability distribution
over the channels. Similarly, none of the eavesdroppers is capable of further
decreasing the secrecy rate of SUs through unilateral action. It is well known
that, for a finite noncooperative game, a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
always exists [37].
To reach an MSNE, an algorithm based on fictitious play (FP) can be
used [38]. FP is a learning scheme in which players update their beliefs
about their opponents by monitoring their actions. Since these actions are
time dependent, we define ai(t) to be the channel chosen by player i at time
t. Let paii (t), ai ∈ Mi, i ∈ P , be the empirical frequency, defined as the
frequency with which player i has chosen action ai until time t. For any time
t, the following recurrence holds:
paii (t) =
t− 1
t
· paii (t− 1) +
1
t
· 1{ai(t−1)=ai}. (2.10)
FP proceeds as follows: at time t, player i observes the actions of all other
players at time t − 1, and then updates its knowledge of the frequencies.
Using (2.10), player i computes p
aj
j (t) ∀aj ∈Mj ,∀j ∈ P \ {i}.
In FP, the channels chosen at time t are the ones that maximize the ex-
pected utility with respect to the updated empirical frequencies. To reach an
MSNE, players’ strategies need to converge to p∗i , the mixed strategy equilib-
rium that maximizes the expected value of the utility U¯i(pi, p
∗
−i) as expressed
in (2.8). To do so, player i’s action at each time step maximizes the expected
utility U¯i(ai,p−i(t)) over the set of actions:
ai(t) = arg max
ai∈Mi
U¯i(ai,p−i(t)). (2.11)
U¯i(ai,p−i(t)) represents the expected utility at the current time t, and it is
given by:
U¯i(ai,p−i(t)) =
∑
a−i∈M−i
Ui(ai,a−i)
∏
aj∈a−i
p
aj
j (t), (2.12)
where p−i(t) represents the vector of empirical frequencies pertaining to the
actions selected by all other players in P \ {i} as calculated by player i at
time t. M−i := ×j∈P\{i}Mj represents the space of all possible actions taken
by all players other than i.
Based on their observations, the players first update their empirical fre-
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quencies using (2.10), and then choose their actions as per (2.11).
As we have seen, the use of FP to find the MSNE of the proposed game
requires each player to be able to observe the others’ actions. For the eaves-
droppers, there is a need to observe the channel selections of the SUs at time
t − 1. This can be done by monitoring the SUs’ transmissions using known
signal processing techniques [33].
The SUs need to be able to observe the channel choices of one another
as well as the actions taken by the eavesdroppers. By monitoring the inter-
ference levels, either via measurements or through feedback from the base
station [33], each SU can, at time t, observe the choices of other SUs at
time t − 1. In the proposed approach, the SUs do not need to observe the
eavesdroppers’ actions, which is often challenging in practice. Instead, by
knowing or estimating the potential locations of eavesdroppers, the SUs can
predict the possible strategy choices of the eavesdroppers. This is possible be-
cause, given the locations and the past actions, an SU is capable of deriving
the best response of each eavesdropper. Note that the actions predicted are
optimal for the eavesdroppers and accordingly the SUs are protecting them-
selves against the worst case scenario. In other words, if the eavesdroppers
deviate from the predicted actions, the SUs will be better off.
2.2.2 Proposed Distributed Learning Algorithm
While FP can be used to find an MSNE, it often leads to extensive compu-
tational requirements especially when dealing with large cognitive networks.
This can be clearly seen from (2.12) and (2.11). In order to overcome this
issue, we propose a novel distributed learning algorithm that can reach an
MSNE of the game at a much lower computational complexity relative to the
standard FP.
Our proposed approach is inspired from regret matching techniques and
the so-called Joint Strategy Fictitious Play (JSFP) introduced in [39]. The
main idea is to enable the players to update their actions based on the regret
for not choosing this action in the past. At time t, each player i has an
expectation of its utility, U¯aii (t), if it chooses ai. This expected utility has
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the following update rule [39]:
U¯aii (t) =
t− 1
t
· U¯aii (t− 1) +
1
t
· U(ai,a−i(t− 1)), (2.13)
where a−i(t − 1) represents the actions taken by all players other than i at
time t− 1 and U(ai,a−i(t− 1)) represents the utility of player i if it chose ai
at time t−1 and it can be computed using (2.7). By doing so, the players do
not need to continuously calculate the expected utility as in (2.12), instead,
they can update their expected utilities ∀ai ∈Mi as per (2.13).
Accordingly, the players update their actions at time t by maximizing their
expectations of the utility over the action space:
ai(t) = arg max
ai∈Mi
U¯aii (t). (2.14)
Note that computing (2.11) has a worst-case complexity of O
(
MN+K
)
while computing (2.14) has a worst-case complexity of O(M) only. Conse-
quently, (2.13) and (2.14) can be readily computed even for large networks,
unlike (2.11) and (2.12).
Based on this idea, we propose a Secure Channel Selection Algorithm (SCSA).
SCSA is a low-complexity distributed learning algorithm that can be used by
SUs and eavesdroppers to reach an equilibrium and it is divided into three
main stages. In the first stage, both SUs and eavesdroppers choose the chan-
nels with equal probabilities as they do not have any observations on the
state of the network initially.
The second stage is called fast learning. In this stage, the players learn
about each others’ decisions and choose their actions according to the update
equations (2.13) and (2.14). Unlike classical regret matching such as in [39],
our proposed approach allows the players to learn an MSNE, not a pure
strategy NE. Therefore, the players will keep observing and updating the
frequencies as per (2.10).
When the difference between all the calculated frequencies in consecutive
time instants is within a certain threshold τ , the players switch to the third
and final stage of the algorithm. In this stage, the players use the standard
fictitious play process starting from the beliefs obtained in stage 2 until they
converge to an MSNE. This algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2.1.
In the proposed algorithm, the players will only switch to stage 3 after
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Algorithm 2.1 Proposed Secure Channel Selection Algorithm
1: procedure SCSA Stage 1 . Initialization
2: Each player i ∈ P chooses a random action ai(0) ∈Mi.
3: end procedure
4: procedure SCSA Stage 2 . Fast Learning
5: repeat
6: Each player i ∈ P observes the actions of other players a−i(t−1) and
updates its average utility as per (2.13).
7: Each player i ∈ P takes action ai(t) as per (2.14).
8: Each player i ∈ P updates his knowledge of empirical frequencies
p−i(t) as per (2.10).
9: until frequencies are within τ .
10: end procedure
11: procedure SCSA Stage 3 . Fictitious Play
12: As a starting point for FP, players use the probabilities obtained in
SCSA Stage 2.
13: repeat
14: Each player i ∈ P observes the actions of other players a−i(t−1) and
updates its knowledge of empirical frequencies p−i(t) as per (2.10).
15: Each player i ∈ P takes action ai(t) as per (2.11).
16: until convergence to a MSNE.
17: end procedure
all frequencies are within the same τ , and therefore they are all guaranteed
to start using standard fictitious play at the same instant. The idea behind
SCSA is to reduce the number of iterations required by FP by allowing the
players to pursue a network learning phase prior to engaging into equilibrium
learning through FP. This renders the problem of finding an MSNE for the
game less complex. Given that the last stage of the proposed algorithm is
based on FP, when it converges, we are guaranteed to reach an MSNE of
the game. We note that, in general, fictitious play does not converge for all
types of games; however, many modification schemes have been suggested to
ensure its convergence [38].
Remark 2.1. The game considered in this chapter may have multiple MSNEs
and our proposed algorithm converges to only one of these, which naturally de-
pends on the starting point. Our particular selection is a very general network
state, where players have no knowledge of the network and start by choosing
random actions. We note that the proposed algorithm can also accommodate
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Figure 2.2: Average utility per SU resulting from SCSA, FP, equiprobable
selection, and classical spectrum sharing as the number N of SUs varies for
K = 3 eavesdroppers.
other starting network states as well. Moreover, advanced spectrum sharing
techniques can also be incorporated [20].
2.3 Simulations and Results
For simulations, we set up the following network: the BS is located at the
center of a 750 m×750 m square with the SUs and eavesdroppers randomly
placed in this area. The secondary users’ transmit power level Pi,m is set to
10 mW ∀m ∈Mi ,∀i ∈ N . Unless otherwise specified, we consider a network
of M = 3 channels. The number of SUs and eavesdroppers are different for
each simulation scenario and they will be specified. We set the noise level to
σ2 = −90 dBm, the path loss exponent to µ = 3 and the path loss constant
is to 1. For SCSA, we set the threshold after which players switch to FP
to τ = 10−2. All the obtained results are averaged over random positions of
SUs and eavesdroppers, channel gains, and channel availability θm.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed SCSA algorithm, we show, in
Figure 2.2, the average expected utility achieved by the SUs as the number
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Figure 2.3: Average utility per SU resulting from SCSA, FP, equiprobable
selection, and classical spectrum sharing as the number K of eavesdroppers
varies for N = 4 SUs.
N of SUs increases for a network with K = 3 eavesdroppers. The perfor-
mance of our approach is compared to that of a classical spectrum sharing
algorithm, in which SUs keep optimizing their capacities given by (2.2) until
all channel selections converge. Also, SCSA is compared to standard FP
and to an equiprobable channel selection algorithm, in which all SUs choose
channels with equal probabilities. Figure 2.2 shows that as the number N of
SUs increases, the average utility per SU decreases for all four schemes. This
is due to the fact that the SUs are utilizing the channels more, and hence the
mutual interference between them is increasing. We can clearly see from Fig-
ure 2.2 that the proposed algorithm and FP have comparable performances
while they both outperform the other two approaches. Figure 2.2 shows that
the proposed SCSA scheme yields a significant improvement, in terms of the
average utility per SU, at all N . This improvement varies between 76.2%
and 89.7% at N = 2 to 25.4% and 32.7% at N = 6, relative to equiprobable
selection and classical spectrum sharing, respectively. Due to the presence of
multiple MSNEs, FP and SCSA may converge to different equilibrium points
with different average utilities. Consequently, in such a scenario, SCSA can
possibly outperform FP on the average and vice versa.
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Figure 2.4: Average number of computations per player resulting from both
SCSA and FP as the number of SUs, N , varies for K = 3 eavesdroppers.
Figure 2.3 shows the average expected utility achieved by the SUs as the
number K of eavesdroppers increases for a network with N = 4 SUs. We
notice that as the number of eavesdroppers increases, the average utility per
SU decreases for all four schemes. This is a result of the fact that an increase
in the number of eavesdroppers will further decrease the overall secrecy rate
of the SUs. In Figure 2.3, we can see that SCSA and FP have a comparable
performance while they both outperform the other two approaches. In this
respect, Figure 2.3 shows that the proposed SCSA scheme yields a signifi-
cant improvement, in terms of the average utility per SU, at all K. This
improvement varies between 62.4% and 53.9% at K = 1 to 15.6% and 18.8%
at K = 5, relative to equiprobable selection and classical spectrum sharing,
respectively.
In Figure 2.4 we show the computational performance of our proposed
secure channel selection algorithm versus FP as the number of SUs, N , in-
creases in the network. We assess the computational needs of both learning
schemes in terms of the average number of utility computations, as per (2.7),
performed per player in order to converge to an MSNE of the game. Fig-
ure 2.4 shows that, as the number N of SUs in the network increases, the
average number of utility computations done by each player increases expo-
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nentially in both algorithms. This is due to the fact that, as N increases, each
SU i will have to consider a larger set of action spaceM−i when calculating
its expected utility. We note that the exponential increase in FP is due to
the fact that computing (2.11) has a worst-case complexity of O
(
MN+K
)
.
The increase in complexity of the proposed secure channel selection algo-
rithm is due to the use of FP at stage 3. Figure 2.4 shows that the proposed
SCSA achieves significant reductions in terms of computation as it requires
86.5% and 74.6% less computation than fictitious play at N = 1 and N = 8,
respectively.
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CHAPTER 3
CR NETWORK SECURITY: PARTIAL
KNOWLEDGE
In this chapter, we discuss the ability of the SUs to evade eavesdroppers in CR
networks while maintaining quality-of-service guarantees for the PUs. Here,
we assume that the SUs have only partial knowledge about the locations of
eavesdroppers. In addition, we consider an advanced eavesdropping model,
different than the one discussed in Chapter 2. In this model, a continuum of
eavesdroppers that can simultaneously wiretap all channels is present.
The objective of the SUs is to ensure a secure link with the BS without
incurring high interference levels on the PU channels at all times. To address
this problem, we consider the case in which the SUs are mobile and are able
to change their locations in the network. This can be the case of military
vehicles moving in the battlefield, mobile users moving using their cars on
highways, or even pedestrians walking around in cities. For example, as
eavesdropping attacks are common in military scenarios, accommodating for
their presence is a must when moving military vehicles around. Moreover,
the government can identify the names of streets and areas that are high-
risk and are known for previous eavesdropping activities and provide this
information to the SUs and the BSs. This would aid in finding safer routes
for commuting SUs. So, the secondary users will mitigate the effect of the
eavesdroppers by changing their locations.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.1, we introduce the system
model and formulate the utility of the SUs. In Section 3.2, we provide the
proposed solution approaches and in Section 3.3, we analyze the simulation
results.
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3.1 System Model and Utility Formulation
3.1.1 System Model
Consider a cognitive radio network comprised of a set M of M licensed
primary users (PUs) or channels which can be accessed by a set N of N
unlicensed secondary users (SUs). The objective of each SU is to securely
communicate with a common base station (BS) by using one of the PU
channels in the presence of eavesdroppers. Eavesdroppers are passive devices
that can decode the user messages on all channels, thus threatening the
confidentiality of the transmitted information. They are spread over a set K
of K circular areas. The centers and radii of these areas, and not the exact
locations of eavesdroppers, are known to the SUs, PUs, and the BS. In each
circular area k, eavesdroppers are assumed to be uniformly distributed with
density λk eavesdroppers per unit area.
In such a cognitive network, the SUs must maintain a certain interference
level at each channel so that the PUs can achieve their quality-of-service
guarantees. This is captured by keeping the actual interference on channel
m below the threshold level I˜m at all times. Moreover, SUs must not interfere
with the PUs’ signal reception. To this end, we assign to each PU a footprint
that represents an area free of SU transmissions [40]. We denote by Xm the
footprint area of PU m. Inside Xm, only the PU m is allowed to transmit its
signal on channel m guaranteeing the PU a low interference medium around
its RF receiver. For the channel, we assume a different model than the one
in Chapter 2. Here, the signal attenuates with the distance d according to
κd−µ, where κ is the path loss constant and µ is the path loss exponent.
To model the movement of the SUs, we partition the network over which
the SUs are spread into v × v congruent square areas. At each time step,
each SU must be at one of the (v + 1)2 vertices. Without loss of generality,
for tractability, we assume that each SU is allowed to move only once to one
of the neighboring vertices, at each time instant. Therefore, at each time
step, an SU has to choose one of the following actions:
1. Send directly on one of the available channels.
2. Send at the next time step from the current location on one of the
available channels.
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Figure 3.1: Illustrative example of the proposed system model.
3. Move to one of the neighboring locations and then send on the next
time step on one of the available channels.
Accordingly, SU i’s action is represented by the triplet (τ, j,m), with τ
the number of time steps SU i waits before transmission, j the location from
which SU i sends its data, and m the chosen channel. Figure 3.1 shows an
illustrative example of a CR network with 10 SUs, 4 PUs, and a number
of eavesdroppers spread over 3 areas. Note that the number of available
channels is not necessarily M on all positions in the network as an SU present
inside a PU’s footprint is unable to send on its channel. For example, SU A
shown in Figure 3.1 is unable to send on channel 1 from positions 2 and 3 as
they happen to be inside X1, PU 1’s footprint area.
3.1.2 Utility Formulation
In general, each SU i will choose the action that will maximize its utility
function Ui. This function captures the SU’s probability of secure commu-
nication, time delay, movement costs, and PU footprint. First, we discuss
the effect of each one of these aspects on the SU and then summarize these
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findings to formalize the utility function.
Secrecy
Physical layer (PHY) security techniques, introduced in [9], are extensively
used to address eavesdropping related problems. It has been shown, by an
information theoretic analysis, that under certain conditions, an SU is able
to send its data securely in the presence of eavesdroppers. These conditions
can be summarized by the following: the channel between this SU and the BS
has to have a higher gain than that between the SU and the most damaging
eavesdropper [9]. Under the path loss channel model considered in this chap-
ter, the channel has a higher gain as the separating distance becomes smaller.
In other words, if the BS is closer to the SU than any other eavesdropper,
the SU’s data can be sent securely.
In each area k, eavesdroppers are uniformly and independently distributed
with a constant density λk. Using stochastic geometry, eavesdroppers’ lo-
cations can be modeled as a stationary Poisson point process with density
λk [41]. Under this model, the probability that no eavesdropper is present
inside a given region A is given by e−λkA, with A the area of A [41].
Therefore, the probability that an SU i can send its data securely, is given
by:
pi =
k=K∏
k=1
e−λkAk . (3.1)
Here, Ak represents the area of the region defined by the intersection of the
following two circles: the first is the circle of eavesdroppers k, and the second
is the circle centered at the SU i with radius d, the distance from SU i to the
BS.
Remark 3.1. Note that Ak = 0 for all k and pi evaluates to 1 when the
BS is closer to SU i than any other eavesdropper. Also, the probability of
secure transmission is independent of the channel choice since all channels
are facing the same eavesdropping attack.
An illustrative example is shown in Figure 3.2. Here, the BS is closer to
SU 1 than any other eavesdropper and hence SU 1 can send its data securely
with probability 1. In contrast, SU 2 can send its data securely only if no
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Figure 3.2: Illustrative example of eavesdropping.
eavesdropper is present in both A2 and A3. Therefore, p2, the probability
that SU 2 can send its data securely is given by:
p2 =
k=3∏
k=1
e−λkAk
= e−λ1A1 × e−λ2A2 × e−λ3A3
= e−λ1A2 × e−λ2A3 ,
where A2 and A3 represent the areas of the shaded regions A2 and A3 in
Figure 3.2. A1 is zero since circle around the SU 1 does not intersect with
the eavesdropping area 1.
Time delay
In addition to secure communication, the SUs are interested in sending their
time sensitive data to the BS promptly. So, each message is assigned a time-
out, τmax, representing the maximum allowed delay for this message. Accord-
ingly, when an SU delays its data transmission, its utility decreases, until it
diminishes when the delay becomes larger than or equal to τmax. We capture
this by adding an exponential decay to the utility function: exp
(
−τ
τmax−τ
)
,
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where τ represents the delay that the message experiences before being sent.
For example, if an SU has a utility U(0) at t = 0, after τ time steps the
utility will be U(τ) = exp
(
−τ
τmax−τ
)
× U(0).
Movement costs
An SU’s mobility incurs a cost that is modeled by adding a constant scalar
η for each time the SU changes its location to one of its neighboring vertices.
The presence of this cost differentiates between the following two actions:
the first is to wait and send on the next time step, while the second is to
move and send on the next time step.
PU footprint
In order to minimize the interference with the PUs’ receivers, the SUs must
not send on channel m if it is inside PU m’s footprint area. To enforce this,
we say that the utility of an SU i sending on channel m from position j is
zero when j ∈ Xm.
Action Space
As previously discussed, an SU’s action is represented by the triplet (τ, j,m).
The number of available channels is M , and hence m ∈ [1,M ]. Since the
message’s timeout is τmax, then τ ∈ [0, τmax − 1]. The number of available
positions for an SU depends on its location and τmax. In general, as an SU
can only move once per time step, the maximum number of possible locations
can be easily shown to be (2τmax − 1)2. Hence, Ai, the action space of SU i,
is:
Ai = [0, τmax − 1]× [1,M ]× [1, (2τmax − 1)2] (3.2)
In this chapter, we define ai := (τ, j,m) to represent the action of SU i, with
ai ∈ Ai.
Remark 3.2. The number of available actions for each SU is the cardinality
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of Ai and it is given by:
|Ai| =
τmax−1∑
τ=0
M · (2τ + 1)2 = M
3
· τmax · (4τ 2max − 1). (3.3)
In summary, we propose the following utility that captures all the afore-
mentioned aspects for each SU i that chooses an action ai = (τ, j,m):
Ui(ai) :=
{ −τj · η if j ∈ Xm or τ > τmax,
pi,j · exp
(
−τ
τmax−τ
)
− τj · η else,
(3.4)
where pi,j represents the probability that SU i can securely transmit its data
at location j and it is given by (3.1). The term τj is the minimum number
of steps the SU i needs to reach position j, and τj ∈ [0 τmax − 1]. Note that
τj is not necessarily the same as τ as the SU may decide to wait and send on
the next time step without changing its location.
3.2 Proposed Solution
In the studied model, the objective is to choose the optimal actions for the
SUs so as to maximize their social welfare, i.e.
∑
i∈N Ui(ai). This optimiza-
tion problem is subject to the constraints dictated by the PUs’ interference
thresholds set on each channel.
We present three different approaches to solve this optimization problem.
In the first approach, we study the centralized solution, assuming that the
BS has perfect knowledge of the SUs’ locations and utilities. In the second,
we study a decentralized game theoretic approach in which the SUs commu-
nicate at each time step. Finally, we introduce the decentralized Lagrangian
heuristic approach in which the SUs can only communicate with the BS that
has no information about the SUs’ utilities.
3.2.1 Centralized Solution Approach
In this section, we formulate the optimization problem and present a cen-
tralized optimal solution approach to solve it. The centralized problem is
solved by the BS that has access to the information about the SUs and their
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utilities, the PUs and the areas where eavesdroppers are present. In this
regard, the problem can be formulated as:
max
a∈A1×···×AN
∑
i∈N
Ui(ai), (3.5)
subject to Im,τ 6 I˜m,τ ∀τ < τmax , ∀m ∈M
where Im,τ represents the level of interference at the BS on channel m at time
τ caused by the SU transmissions, I˜m,τ is the maximum allowed interference
as set by the PUs, and a is the vector a1, a2, . . . , aN of the SU actions.
The BS’s goal is to choose the action vector a that maximizes the social
welfare of the SUs in the presence of PUs and eavesdroppers. In other words,
the BS assigns for each SU the appropriate channel, sending location and
transmission time.
To solve this problem, we first cast it as a binary integer program. Here,
for each SU i, channel m, position j and time τ , we assign a binary variable
xi,τ,j,m. Accordingly, the objective function to be maximized can be equiva-
lently written as
∑
i,τ,j,m Ui(τ, j,m) · xi,τ,j,m. This new formulation adds the
following constraint: for each SU i, at most one of xi’s can be set to 1. This
means that, if xi,τ,j,m = 1, then the action taken by SU i is ai = (τ, j,m). We
now formulate the binary integer program that is equivalent to the problem
in (3.5):
max f(x) =
∑
i,τ,j,m
Ui(τ, j,m) · xi,τ,j,m
subject to
∑
τ,j,m
xi,τ,j,m 6 1, ∀i ∈ N . (3.6)∑
i
xi,τ,j,m · I (i, j) 6 I˜τ,m,∀τ < τmax ,∀m ∈M,
xi,τ,j,m ∈ {0, 1}.
I(i, j) represents the interference at the BS when SU i sends its data from
location j and it is given by:
I(i, j) = Pid
−µ
j ,
with Pi the power of the signal transmitted by SU i and dj the distance
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between location j and the BS.
Notice that the problem formulated in (3.6) is actually a General assign-
ment problem (GAP). This problem has been extensively studied in the liter-
ature and there are many efficient algorithms to solve it [42]. The solution to
the proposed GAP in (3.6) is the optimal solution for the centralized problem
discussed in (3.5) since both problems are equivalent.
3.2.2 Decentralized Game Theoretic Approach
In this section, we consider the case in which each SU maximizes its own
utility Ui, instead of maximizing the social welfare. Although the utility Ui
is a function of ai only, the set of admissible actions for SU i is determined
by a−i := {a1, a2, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aN}, the actions of all the SUs other
than i. In this case, we say that the constraints are interdependent and the
actions of the SUs are coupled. This coupling stems from the constraints and
this renders the problem game theoretic [43]. We note that this game is not
a classical noncooperative game. In classical noncooperative game theory,
the utility of a player is a function of the actions taken by (a subset of) all
players [37]. In this scenario, we assume that each SU is able to communicate
with the BS and all the other SUs. We now formulate a decentralized game
theoretic version of the problem in (3.5).
Now, each SU i solves the following optimization problem:
max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai)
subject to Im,τ 6 I˜m,τ , ∀τ < τmax ,∀m ∈M. (3.7)
Denote by A˜i(a−i) the action set Ai subject to the constraints in (3.7) as
determined by the actions a−i, so that SU i’s problem becomes:
max
ai∈A˜i(a−i)
Ui(ai) (3.8)
Therefore, the problem described in (3.8) is a generalized game with cou-
pled constraints [43] whose solution is the Generalized nash equilibrium (GNE).
The GNE is more general than the ordinary Nash equilibrium as it accounts
for the coupling in the action sets too, and it is defined below.
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Definition 3.1. A GNE is the vector a¯ such that for all i ∈ N , ai =
arg max
ai∈A˜i
Ui(ai) with A˜i = A˜i(a−i).
After examining the game formulation, we can state the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.1. The game presented above is a generalized potential Nash
game.
Proof. Consider the function f(x) =
∑
i fi(x). This function is a potential
function of the game since each fi(x) depends on xi only. The generalized
potential function is given in Definition 2.1 in [43].
To solve this problem and find the GNE of the game, we first transform it
into a binary integer program similar to the one in (3.6). So, for each SU i
the problem is equivalent to:
max fi(x) =
∑
τ,j,m
Ui(τ, j,m) · xi,τ,j,m
subject to
∑
τ,j,m
xi,τ,j,m = 1, (3.9)∑
i,j
xi,τ,j,m · I (i, j) 6 I˜τ,m,∀τ < τmax ,∀m ∈M,
xi,τ,j,m ∈ {0, 1}.
We now propose the following algorithm, called the Iterative Constrained
Best Response (ICBR) algorithm. Initially, I˜ is initialized to the require-
ments set by the PUs. Then, randomly and sequentially, each SU chooses
the action that maximizes its utility according to the available channel con-
straints. In other words, the user solves the optimization problem in (3.9).
When an SU chooses to send at time τ and channel m from position j, the
corresponding I˜τ,m will be updated to I˜τ,m = I˜τ,m − Ij and broadcast to all
the SUs. The other SUs will now solve the problem (3.9) with the updated I˜.
Finally, after the first round is over, each SU solves (3.9) again for the optimal
solution with the available constraints. This is repeated until convergence.
This algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3.1.
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Algorithm 3.1 Iterative Constrained Best Response (ICBR)
1: procedure ICBR Stage 1 . Initialization
2: I˜m,τ is initialized to the original interference constraint as given by
the PUs.
3: end procedure
4: procedure ICBR Stage 2 . Optimization
5: repeat
6: Each SU i solves the optimization problem in (3.9) with the available
constraints I˜m,τ . The action (j, τ,m) obtained is the best response.
7: According to the chosen action (j, τ,m), I˜m,τ is updated to I˜m,τ−I(j).
8: until actions converge.
9: end procedure
Remark 3.3. The ICBR algorithm is actually a nonlinear Gauss-Seidel best
response algorithm. It is guaranteed to converge for generalized potential
Nash games with coupled action sets and objective functions that are inde-
pendent from the actions of other users [43, 44].
3.2.3 Distributed Lagrangian Approach
In this section we present a distributed optimization approach for solving the
problem in (3.5). The approach discussed here is a Lagrangian relaxation of
the GAP in (3.6). Note that, in this scenario, we assume that the BS has no
information about the SUs and their utilities. Also, the SUs have minimal
communication capabilities and they can only communicate with the BS.
Define the Lagrangian L(x, λ) by incorporating the coupled constraints∑
i
∑
j xi,τ,j,m · Ii,τ,j,m 6 I˜τ,m into the objective function:
L(x, λ) =
∑
i,τ,j,m
−Ui(τ, j,m) · xi,τ,j,m
+
∑
m,τ
λτ,m ·
(∑
i,j
xi,τ,j,m · Ii,τ,j,m − I˜τ,m
)
=
∑
i
∑
τ,j,m
(−Ui(τ, j,m) + λτ,m · Ii,τ,j,m) · xi,τ,j,m
−
∑
m,τ
λτ,m · I˜τ,m. (3.10)
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Algorithm 3.2 Distributed Lagrangian Optimization (DLO)
1: procedure DLO Stage 1 . Initialization
2: λˆ(0) is initialized to zeros. Set t = 0 initially.
3: end procedure
4: procedure DLO Stage 2 . Optimization
5: repeat
6: Each SU i solves the optimization problem in (3.12) to find xˆti for
λ = λˆ(t). xˆti and the corresponding I(i, j) are transmitted to the BS.
7: The BS broadcasts the new values of λˆ(t+1) as per (3.14).
8: until actions converge.
9: end procedure
And now, we minimize the Lagrangian to find d(λ):
d(λ) = min
x
L(x, λ). (3.11)
We can see that the objective function in (3.10) is separable, and accordingly
the problem that each SU i solves is finding xˆi,τ,j,m for a fixed i and for all
(τ, j,m) that solves:
min
x
∑
τ,j,m
(−Ui(τ, j,m) + λτ,m · Ii,τ,j,m) · xi,τ,j,m
subject to
∑
τ,j,m
xi,τ,j,m = 1 (3.12)
xi,τ,j,m ∈ {0, 1}.
Solving (3.12) becomes very simple as the SU i sets xˆi,τ,j,m to one and all
other xˆi’s to zero when (τ, j,m) minimizes (−Ui(τ, j,m) + λτ,m · Ii,τ,j,m). The
solution of (3.12) becomes optimal when λ is equal to λ∗ which is the solution
of:
λ∗ = arg max
λ>0
d(λ). (3.13)
Obtaining the optimal value for λ∗ is a very difficult and challenging problem
in GAP relaxations [45,46]. Accordingly, we present here a heuristic subopti-
mal approach, which we call the Distributed Lagrangian Optimization (DLO)
algorithm, to arrive at the vector λˆ that allows the SUs to choose their ac-
tions distributively without violating the coupled constraints. In order to
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find λˆ and xˆ, we present an algorithm based on the well-known subgradi-
ent method [47]. First at time t = 0, the vector λˆ(0) is initialized to zeros,
and then each SU solves the optimization problem in (3.12). The results,
xˆt and the corresponding interference I(i, j), are sent to the BS which in
turn checks if the solution obtained is feasible by verifying the conditions:∑
i
∑
j xˆ
t
i,τ,j,m · I (j) 6 I˜τ,m,∀τ ∀m. If one or more are violated, the BS
updates the value of λ using the update rule:
λˆ(t+1)τ,m =
(
λˆ(t)τ,m + l(t)×
(∑
i,j
xˆti,τ,j,m · I (i, j)− I˜τ,m
))+
, (3.14)
where l(t) is the step size with l(0) = 1 and it is updated by l(t+ 1) = l(t)/2
every h iterations. Now, the BS sends the updated vector λt+1 to the SUs
which in turn solve the problem in (3.12) again. When (3.14) converges, i.e.
xˆ obtained from SUs is feasible and no need for an update, we stop iterating.
The DLO algorithm is summarized here in Algorithm 3.2.
Note that there are many other algorithms that can lead to a better approx-
imation of the optimal value x∗, but they require additional computational
complexity and complete knowledge of the network and SU utilities at the
BS [46]. The above algorithm is simple and does not require the BS to have
any information about the network or the SUs.
3.3 Simulations and Results
For simulations, we consider a 500 m×500 m square area with the BS at the
center. The number of SUs N and the number of areas with eavesdroppers
K are varied within this area. Unless otherwise specified, we set the number
of squares to v = 20, the number of channels to M = 2, the eavesdropper
area radius to 30 m, and the PU footprint radius to 10 m. The SU transmit
power is set to P = 100 mW. The wireless medium has a path loss exponent
µ = 3, a path loss constant κ = 1 and a noise level σ2 = −90 dBm. We
set the movement cost to η = 0.01. All statistical results are averaged over
multiple random runs for different positions of eavesdroppers PUs and SUs.
In Figure 3.3, we show the average utility per SU as the number of SUs,
N , increases in the network for I˜ = 3× 10−9 and τmax = 2. The results show
34
4 6 8 10 12
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Number of SUs (N)
Av
er
ag
e 
Ut
ilit
y 
pe
r S
U
 
 
Optimal Centralized (Full Information)
(ICBR) Game Theoretic Decentralized
(DLO) Lagrangian Decentralized
Figure 3.3: The average utility per SU as the number of SUs N increases.
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Figure 3.5: The average utility per SU as the number of areas with
eavesdroppers K increases.
that as N increases, the average utility per SU decreases slowly. Indeed, we
can see that the SUs’ performance was degraded by 50% on average when N
was increased by a factor of 4 (from N = 3 to N = 12). This result is due to
the fact that, with the available time, interference threshold, and channels,
the network can accommodate more SUs. As expected, Figure 3.3 clearly
shows that the optimal algorithm with full information outperforms the non-
optimal ones. The ICBR algorithm was near-optimal and only 11% less than
the optimal value in the worst case with much less information. The DLO
algorithm was able to perform well without the SUs communicating and it
was 60% to 40% less than the optimal performance. We notice that the
ICBR algorithm was able to benefit from the communication links between
the SUs, a property that the DLO algorithm lacks.
In Figure 3.4, we show how the increase in the message timeout, τmax,
affects the average utility per SU. In this figure, we can see that, as the
message timeout increases, the average utility per SU increases. This is due
to the fact that as τmax increases, the SUs will have more time to transmit
and thus they are able to move and reach a larger subset of the network. The
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Figure 3.6: The average utility per SU as the density of eavesdroppers λ
increases.
optimal centralized algorithm with full information clearly outperformed the
decentralized ICBR and DLO algorithms. Here, the ICBR algorithm was 15%
and 2% less than the optimal value at τmax = 1 and τmax = 6, respectively.
For these same values of τmax, the DLO algorithm was 35% and 24% less than
the optimal value, respectively. Here, we can also see that, as the resources
become more abundant, the price of SU selfishness decreases. Again, the
ICBR outperformed the DLO algorithm as the communication between SUs
helped in increasing the overall social welfare.
Figure 3.5 shows how increasing the number of areas with eavesdroppers,
K, affects the average overall utility per an SU. In general, as the number of
areas, K, increases, the average utility per SU decreases for all algorithms.
This is due to the fact that with more eavesdroppers, the probability of
secure transmission decreases. Also, SUs will have to move longer distances
to evade potential eavesdropping, thus incurring movement costs and delays.
The optimal algorithm outperformed the decentralized ones. Here, both the
ICBR and DLO algorithms achieved near-optimal results. In the worst case,
the ICBR and DLO algorithms were 11% and 29% less than the optimal
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value, respectively.
We show in Figure 3.6 the average utility per SU as λ, the density of
eavesdroppers, increases. We notice that, as the density of eavesdroppers in-
creases, the average utility per SU decreases. This is due to the fact that as
the density of eavesdropping increases, the probability of secure transmission
decreases. As expected, the optimal centralized algorithm with full informa-
tion outperformed the decentralized algorithms. As the decentralized algo-
rithms achieved near-optimal performances, the ICBR again outperformed
the DLO algorithm. In the worst case, the former was 4% less than the
optimal value while the latter was 24.5% less.
In summary, Figures 3.3 to 3.6 clearly show that the ICBR algorithm
was able to provide solid results without the need for a centralized BS to
perform the optimization. The results of the DLO algorithm show that the
lack of communication between SUs drastically affects the overall network
performance.
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CHAPTER 4
SMALL CELL NETWORK SECURITY
In this chapter, we switch the topic and discuss the security of small cell net-
works. As introduced in Section 1.3, small cell networks were presented as a
solution to the increasing demand in mobile services. Like most other wire-
less technologies, small cell networks are susceptible to threats, and therefore
security measures and remedies should be advised. In particular, we study,
in this chapter, how the potential presence of eavesdroppers and/or jammers
may affect the deployment of SCBSs in small cell networks.
We consider that the network operator needs to optimally place the SCBSs
in order to boost the efficiency and secrecy of the mobile user transmissions
in the presence of security threats. These security threats, such as eaves-
dropping and jamming [48], are common in military scenarios, and accom-
modating for their presence is a must when deploying SCBSs for military
use. Also, before deploying the SCBSs in cities, the government can provide
the network operator with the names of streets and areas that are high-risk
and are known for previous malicious network activity (such as hackers, jam-
ming groups, eavesdroppers, etc.). These threats can also be considered in
many other scenarios and for different applications, such as securely placing
wireless access points in large schools, malls, or other businesses.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.1, we study a general
attack scenario and introduce the general problem. In Section 4.2, we provide
the proposed solution for an eavesdropping attack while in Section 4.3, we
propose a solution for a jamming attack. Finally, Section 4.4 considers a
combination of both aforementioned attacks.
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4.1 A General Attack Scenario
Consider a wireless heterogeneous network that is represented by a convex
polygon Q. A continuum of wireless users is scattered over the whole area
with a density function ψ : Q → R+. To serve these users, a set B =
{b1, b2, · · · , bn} ⊂ Qn of N small cell base stations (SCBSs)1 is deployed
over Q. A power-law path loss model with exponent µ is considered as the
channel model. That is, a signal sent from the origin experiences a gain
of κ(1 + d2)−µ/2 at a distance d, with µ the pathloss exponent and κ the
pathloss constant. This model is generally used in the study of spatial SINR
problems [24].
The deployment of SCBSs in a heterogeneous network considerably af-
fects the performance of all users, and thus it is critical to optimally place
these SCBSs. The challenges of optimally deploying SCBSs are exacerbated
by the presence of potential security threats at different locations in the
network. Under such potential security threats, random or traditional non-
secure placement techniques are no longer effective as they allow eavesdrop-
pers to wiretap the transmitted messages, thus breaching the confidentiality
of the network. Also, the jammer’s signal will decrease the network SINR,
compromising the network’s availability. The placement problem becomes
more challenging when different attack types and scenarios are considered.
Each attack type should be handled differently and uniquely in order to
minimize its threat to the overall well-being of the network. In this work,
we consider the following most common types of attacks: an eavesdropping
attack, a jamming attack, and finally a simultaneous jamming and eaves-
dropping attack.
First, we consider a general attack scenario in which the users are facing
security threats and the SCBSs need to be placed in order to minimize the
effects of the attacks faced. In our case, the network operator is interested in
improving the social welfare of the network by maintaining secure high-gain
channels between the users and their serving SCBSs. Accordingly, each user
q ∈ Q must be assigned a suitable utility function f that captures both the
security and the quality of the channel. In general, a user q will connect to
the SCBS bi that maximizes its utility. Hereinafter, we restrict f to be a
function of ||q−bi||, the distance separating the user q from its serving SCBS
1This set can also encompass macrocell base stations.
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bi, although the proposed approach can accommodate other forms for the
utility function as well. This class of utilities captures the relative distance
between users and the SCBS and covers a large variety of applications such
as: placement problems, consensus, and maximum coverage problems [49].
The network operator’s problem is to choose the locations of the SCBSs such
that the collective social welfare of all users, i.e. the integral of f over the
whole network’s area Q, is maximized. Thus, the optimal placement problem
can be formally written as:
max
B∈Qn
X (B), (4.1)
with
X (B) =
∫
Q
max
i∈{1,··· ,n}
f(||q − bi||)ψ(q)dq. (4.2)
The problem formulated in (4.1) describes the general problem and covers
all the attacks considered in this work. X (B) given in (4.2) is changed to
accommodate the attack scenario.
4.2 Eavesdropping Attacks
In this section, we investigate the case where the potential security threats
stem from eavesdropping. Eavesdroppers are passive devices that can decode
the user messages, thus threatening the confidentiality of the transmitted
information. First, we discuss the eavesdropper model, and then provide our
solution approach.
4.2.1 Eavesdropper Model
In the considered network, a number of eavesdroppers are assumed to be
scattered over a circular area of center O and radius r. We assume that their
exact positions are unknown to the network operator and the users. Here,
unlike the assumptions made in Chapter 3, the users and network operator
have no information about the densities of eavesdroppers. An example of the
SCBS placement problem is given in Figure 4.1.
As we have already discussed in 3.1.2, physical layer (PHY) security tech-
niques [9] are extensively used in many eavesdropping related problems. Sec-
tion 3.1.2 introduced the probability of secure transmission and it was given
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Figure 4.1: Placing SCBSs in the presence of eavesdroppers.
in (3.1). We notice, from (3.1), that obtaining the exact value of this prob-
ability requires additional information about the density and distribution of
eavesdroppers. As this information is not available here, it is impossible for
the network operator or for the user to compute the exact probability.
Nevertheless, a user can always know whether its probability of secure
transmission is 1 or less than 1 without computing the exact value. This
is solely determined by finding the distances between the user, the serving
SCBS, and the region in which eavesdroppers are located. Accordingly, we
define a transmission to be secure if and only if the probability of secure
transmission is 1. In this chapter, we say that a user is “secure” if its trans-
mission is secure.
4.2.2 The Reward Function
Against such eavesdropping attacks, the network operator aims to place the
SCBSs in the network in order to provide secure users with better QoS guar-
antees. Inherently, the SCBSs need to be closer to the secure users rather
than the other non-secure users. That is the case since, as users are in-
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terested in message confidentiality, a non-secure transmission is worthless.
Thus, secure transmissions should be served better.
Accordingly, to solve this problem we direct our attention to secure users
and minimize the distance separating them from their serving SCBS. This
translates into the following: the SCBSs should give more priority to users
away from the region that is susceptible to eavesdropping and less priority to
users near the region that is susceptible to eavesdropping. We achieve this by
assigning an artificial density reward function φE to every user in the network.
The reward function represents the priority of each user as perceived by the
SCBSs. A higher priority means that a user is more valuable for the SCBSs
as it is in a more secure location. Below, we introduce two types of reward
functions.
The linear reward
Users inside the region that is susceptible to eavesdropping can never commu-
nicate with the SCBS with probability 1 and hence a reward of 0 is assigned
to them. Users farther away from this insecure region are more probable to
securely communicate with the SCBS. Hence, as users gradually move away
from the insecure region, they are given higher priorities by the SCBSs. This
is reflected by assigning user q a positive reward, which is ||q−O||−r, where
||q−O|| is the distance between the user q andO, the center of eavesdropping.
Equation (4.3) and Figure 4.2 summarize the linear reward function.
φE1 (q) =
0 when ||q −O|| 6 r,||q −O|| − r else. (4.3)
The square reward
In a similar manner, we introduce a square distance reward density function.
Using the same analysis, users inside the insecure region are assigned a reward
of 0. Higher reward values are assigned to users farther away and this is
reflected by assigning user q a positive reward, which is (||q − O|| − r)2,
where ||q − O|| is the distance between the user q and O, the center of
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Figure 4.2: The linear reward function φE1 .
eavesdropping.
Formally, the square reward function is given by:
φE2 (q) =
0 when ||q −O|| 6 r,(||q −O|| − r)2 else. (4.4)
4.2.3 Proposed Solution Approach
The eavesdropping problem is a special case of the general attack scenario
presented in Section 4.1. The next step is to define the utility function f .
Users are interested in secure transmissions while also maintaining a desirable
quality of service, as quantified by the channel quality. Both are achieved by
being as close to the SCBS as possible. Therefore, we define f(q) = −||q−bi||2
where bi is the SCBS serving user q. The priority of each user is bundled
with its density, and hence X (B) becomes:
X (B) =
∫
Q
max
i∈{1,··· ,n}
−||q − bi||2ψ(q)φE(q)dq
= −
∫
Q
min
i∈{1,··· ,n}
||q − bi||2ψ(q)φE(q)dq, (4.5)
where φE can be either the linear reward φE1 or the square reward φ
E
2 .
Therefore, the problem of optimal placement of SCBSs in a wireless net-
work with potential eavesdropping threat is given by (4.1) with X (B) given
in (4.5). To study the properties of X (B), we state the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. If f is concave, then X (B) is concave in b.
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Proof. For a fixed q, the map b 7→ f(||q − b||)φE(q)ψ(q) is concave, and the
integral with respect to q will also be concave [47].
Using Lemma 4.1, we can see that X (B) is concave in bi for all i and
thus to find the optimal locations of SCBSs, it is necessary and sufficient
to look at the configurations in which the derivative is zero. To evaluate
the integral in (4.5) and to facilitate the derivation, we use the concept of
Voronoi partitions defined as follows [50]:
Definition 4.1. Given a set Q ⊂ R2 and a set B = {b1, b1, · · · , bn} ⊂
Qn, the Voronoi partition of Q generated by B is the collection of sets
{V1(B), · · · , Vn(B)} defined by: Vi(B) = {q ∈ Q| ||q−bi|| 6 ||q−bj||∀bj ∈ B}.
Using Definition 4.1, the integral in (4.5) becomes:
X (B) = −
n∑
i=1
∫
Vi(B)
||q − bi||2ψ(q)φE(q)dq. (4.6)
Deriving X (B) with respect to bi gives:
∂X (B)
∂bi
= 2
∫
Vi(B)
(q − bi)ψ(q)φE(q)dq
= 2MVi(B)(CVi(B) − bi), (4.7)
where MVi(B) =
∫
Vi(B)
ψ(q)φE(q)dq is the mass of the area Vi(B) with respect
to the joint reward-density function ψφE and CVi(B) =
∫
Vi(B)
qψ(q)φE(q)dq
MVi(B)
is
the center of mass of Vi(B) weighted according to ψφ
E. So, to find the
maximizing solution, we can use the following law: bi = CVi(B).
We now present the optimal placement algorithm which we use to arrive
at the optimizing solution. First, we start with random SCBS positions
B0 ⊂ Qn. Then, for each SCBS bi, the maximizing law bi = CVi(B) is applied
to arrive at the new positions. Vi(B) is obtained at this stage by holding
the positions of all other SCBSs fixed. Finally, after calculating all the new
positions, the network operator computes the new Voronoi partition Vi(B)
for each bi and repeats the previous step until convergence. We note that,
although this algorithm is carried out by the network operator, it is actu-
ally distributed by nature. Algorithm 4.1 gives the details of the optimal
placement algorithm.
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Algorithm 4.1 Proposed Optimal Placement Algorithm
1: procedure Stage 1 . Initialization
2: Start with a random SCBS positions B0 ⊂ Qn.
3: end procedure
4: procedure Stage 2 . Optimal Placement Update
5: repeat
6: For all bi ∈ B0, each bi assumes all other bj’s are fixed and finds its
Voronoi set Vi(B).
7: The new positions are obtained using bi = CVi(B).
8: Each bi updates its position in B0.
9: until B0 converges.
10: end procedure
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Figure 4.3: Average utility of users U1 as the number of SCBSs varies.
Remark 4.1. This proposed algorithm can be easily shown to be a special
case of the class of discrete-time spatially-distributed algorithms for coverage
control introduced in [50]. Consequently, as per [50], it is guaranteed that the
proposed algorithm will converge to the unique optimal solution.
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of users covered versus the eavesdropping radius.
4.2.4 Simulation Results and Analysis
We now simulate the presented optimal placement algorithm and study at
its performance. We consider Q to be a 500 m×500 m square area with the
wireless users uniformly distributed over it. Eavesdroppers are spread over
a disk with known center O and radius r. No other information is avail-
able to the network operator about the eavesdroppers’ locations or densities.
All statistical results are averaged over multiple random runs for different
locations of eavesdroppers and starting points of the algorithm.
We compare the performance of the different reward functions against the
base case with no reward for the utility function U1 given by:
U1 =
∫
Q
max
i∈{1,··· ,n}
−||q − bi||21{p=1},
with p the probability of secure transmission. U1 represents the negative
square distance of secure users, i.e. users who can securely communicate
with the SCBS. The no reward case places the SCBSs optimally without
regarding the eavesdropping threat, similar to [24].
Figure 4.3 shows the variation in utility (U1) as the number of SCBSs
increases for a constant eavesdropping radius r = 125 m. In this figure,
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of users covered versus the number of SCBSs.
we can see that the proposed algorithm, when used with square and linear
rewards, yields up to 53.9% and 44.3% improvement in the overall utility U1
at n = 2 over the algorithm with no reward respectively. Also, as the number
of SCBSs increases for a constant eavesdropping radius, the utility generally
increases until it finally saturates. This is due to the fact that the relative
distance between users and SCBSs is decreasing.
In Figure 4.4, we further evaluate the performance of the proposed ap-
proach using the “coverage percentage” as a metric, as the eavesdropping
radius varies. The coverage percentage is defined as the percentage of secure
users, users that can securely communicate with their serving SCBS. Fig-
ure 4.4 clearly shows that the algorithm with no reward covers more users
for a lower eavesdropping radius. As the eavesdropping radius increases, lin-
ear reward and square reward start performing better. This is due to the fact
that the linear and square rewards penalize the non-secure users and reward
the farther away secure users. Here, the coverage percentage obtained by the
algorithm with linear reward was within 95% to 120% of the no reward case
while the square reward was within 89% to 113%.
In Figure 4.5, we further show that as the number of SCBSs increases
for a constant eavesdropping radius, 125 m in this case, the percentage area
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Figure 4.6: Average utility versus the number of SCBSs.
covered generally increases. This is due to the fact that with more available
SCBSs, users are closer to the SCBSs and hence it is more probable for them
to be secure. Also, the coverage percentage obtained by the algorithm with
linear reward was within 98% to 107% of the no reward case while the square
reward was within 91% to 100%.
Figure 4.6 shows the relative utility as the number of SCBSs increases.
The relative utility is defined as the ratio of the average utility U1 to the area
covered. In other words, it combines both aspects presented in Figure 4.3
and Figure 4.5 as it represents the utility per unit area. Figure 4.6 shows
that the algorithm with the square and linear reward functions was able
to overcome the effect of eavesdropping and provide the users with higher
relative utilities. The square and linear rewards yield up to 51.0% and 45.5%
improvement in the relative utility at n = 2 over the algorithm with no
reward respectively. As the number of SCBSs increases, the gap between
the rewarded and non-rewarded plots decreases. This is due to the fact
that adding more SCBSs makes the users closer to their serving SCBS, thus
rendering the reward functions less influential.
Clearly, by analyzing Figures 4.3 to 4.6, we can conclude that using either
the linear reward φE1 or the square reward φ
E
2 gives better average and relative
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Pj: Jamming Power
P: Transmission Power
Figure 4.7: A jammer jamming 3 SCBSs.
utilities than the no reward case. The network operator may opt to choose
the linear φE1 over the square φ
E
2 as it provides better coverage percentages
with similar relative utility results.
4.3 Jamming Attacks
In this section, we introduce the jamming problem. First, we discuss the
jammer model and then we provide our solution approach.
4.3.1 Jammer Model
In addition to the N SCBSs, a jammer, with a constant jamming power Pj
and a linear jamming cost coefficient cj, exists in the network. As jamming
with high power can lead to immense energy expenditures, a constant cost cj
is added to capture the price of jamming. The jammer’s location information
can be obtained by the network operator by monitoring the network activity
and using known signal processing techniques [33]. Figure 4.7 shows a jammer
acting in a network with three SCBSs.
In the presence of a jammer, the network operator aims to place the SCBSs
in order to increase the overall downlink SINR of the network. Without loss
of generality, we study the case in which all the SCBSs are using the same
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frequency band. The overall SINR is then given by:
SINR =
n∑
i=1
∫
Vi(B)
Pκ (1 + ||q − bi||2)−µ/2
I(bi) + Pjκ (1 + ||j − bi||2)−µ/2 + σ2
ψ(q) dq, (4.8)
where I(bi) is the interference experienced at the SCBS bi by all wireless
users in the network when using the same frequency band, and it is given by:
I(bi) =
∫
Q
θ · Pκ (1 + ||x− bi||2)−µ/2 dx, (4.9)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of users that are currently utilizing the
downlink channel. Certainly, our approach can accommodate the presence
of multiple jammers and can be easily extended for other frequency sharing
techniques.
First, we investigate the behavior of the jammer. A user’s transmission is
either safe or jammed (i.e. not safe). We define a transmission to be safe
when the power of the signal received at the SCBS by the user is higher than
that received by the jammer. In other words, a user’s transmission is safe
when
Pκ(1 + d2)−µ/2 > Pjκ(1 + d2j)−µ/2, (4.10)
where d is the distance between the user and its serving SCBS and dj is that
between the jammer and the same SCBS. We can directly change (4.10) to
d2 6 β(d2j + 1)− 1, (4.11)
with β =
(
Pj
P
)−2
µ
.
The jammer’s main objective is to jam the maximum possible area. Intu-
itively, this is the same as minimizing the safe area or equivalently, minimizing
β. At the same time, the jammer incurs some costs for using the power and
hence the problem becomes:
min
Pj>0
(
Pj
P
)−2/µ
+ cjPj. (4.12)
Lemma 4.2. The function to be minimized in (4.12) is convex in Pj and the
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optimal value P ∗j is given by:
P ∗j =
(µ
2
cjP
2
µ
)µ/(µ+2)
. (4.13)
Proof. The second derivative proves convexity. Applying the theory of un-
constrained convex optimization leads to the solution in (4.13).
From (4.13), as the jamming cost cj increases, the optimal jamming power
P ∗j decreases. Similarly, P
∗
j also decreases with increase in P , the users’
sending power.
4.3.2 The Reward Function
In order to maximize the SINR of the network, we introduce an approximate
problem that simplifies the placement problem. We look at (4.11) again and
we rewrite it as:
d2 6 βd2j + (β − 1). (4.14)
The locations of the SCBSs affect the values of d and dj. According to (4.14),
the SCBSs seek to minimize d2 and maximize d2j in order to enhance the
performance of wireless users. Recall that d is the distance between the user
and the serving SCBS while dj is the distance between the SCBS and the
jammer. Hence, in order to minimize d2, the users connect to the nearest
SCBS and the SCBS minimizes the distance with the wireless users. To
maximize d2j , the SCBS should be farther away from the jammer.
Thus, in summary, the SCBSs have to minimize the distance separating
them from the users without being too close to the jammer. To address this
problem, we introduce a jamming threshold . The jamming threshold is
the value beyond which the SCBS considers the jammer as ineffective. So, if
Pj(1 + d
2
j)
−µ
2 < , jamming is ineffective. We say that an SCBS is inside the
effective area if it is within a distance R∗ from the jammer, where:
R∗ =
((
Pj

)−2/µ
− 1
)1/2
. (4.15)
In order to prevent the SCBSs from residing inside the effective area, we
add an artificial reward function φJ for the wireless users in the network. To
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Pj: Jamming Power
ε: Jamming Threshold
Effective Area
R*: Effective Radius𝜙j1 =0
𝜙j1 = 1
Figure 4.8: The reward function φJ1 .
ensure that the SCBS will be placed farther away from the jammer, we set
the reward φJ1 (q) of user q to:
φJ1 (q) =
0 when ||q − j|| 6 R∗,1 else, (4.16)
where j is the location of the jammer. We will also consider another reward
function φJ2 (q) and it is given by
φJ2 (q) =
||q − j||2 when ||q − j|| 6 R∗,(R∗)2 else. (4.17)
Figure 4.8 shows the reward function φJ1 with a network jammer.
4.3.3 Solution Approach
Consequently, the problem to be solved is to maximize X (B) over the possible
locations, where:
X (B) =
∫
Q
max
i∈{1,··· ,n}
−||q − bi||2φJ(q)ψ(q)dq
= −
∫
Q
min
i∈{1,··· ,n}
||q − bi||2φJ(q)ψ(q)dq (4.18)
= −
n∑
i=1
∫
Vi(B)
||q − bi||2φJ(q)ψ(q)dq,
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Figure 4.9: Overall network SINR versus the number of SCBSs.
with Vi(B) the Voronoi partition of bi generated by the set of positions B,
defined in Definition 4.1, and φJ(q) can be either φJ1 (q) or φ
J
2 (q). Notice that
the problem the SCBSs have to solve is similar to (4.1) in 4.2.3.
Using the same optimal placement algorithm given in Algorithm 4.1, we
can solve the problem in (4.18) and obtain the optimal solution for the lo-
cations of the SCBSs. The optimal placement algorithm works exactly the
same way for the case of the jammer, and its convergence to the optimal
solution again holds.
4.3.4 Simulation Results and Analysis
To assess the performance of the optimal placement algorithm against a
jammer, we evaluate the overall SINR of the network as per (4.8). Again, we
simulate the presented algorithm over a 500 m×500 m square network and the
wireless users uniformly distributed over it. The transmission power of users
is set to P = 100 mW while the jamming cost is fixed to cj = 0.5 × 10−4,
unless otherwise specified. The wireless medium has a pathloss exponent
µ = 3 and a noise level σ2 = 10−12. We set the jamming threshold  = 10−3.
We set the density of the users to 1, 000 users/km2 (to represent a typical
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Figure 4.10: Overall network SINR versus the jamming cost cj.
city) and the network’s activity θ to 0.5. This means that half of the users
in the network are utilizing the uplink channel at the same time.
Figure 4.9 shows the performance of our approach in terms of the overall
SINR given in (4.8). The performance of our algorithm is evaluated when
using φJ1 and φ
J
2 as reward functions in comparison with the base case (i.e. no
reward added). Again, the no reward case represents the optimal placement
with no regard for the jamming threat. Figure 4.9 shows that as the number
of SCBSs increases, the overall SINR of the network increases. This is due to
the fact that the users are becoming closer to their serving SCBS. Using the
reward function φJ1 provides the highest overall network SINR for different
numbers of SCBSs ranging from 3 to 10. It outperforms both the no reward
and φJ2 reward for all values of n and provides up to 26.1% increase at n = 3
over the no reward scenario. This is the case since it prevents the SCBSs
from approaching the jammer in a certain radius, but at the same time, it
keeps on minimizing the distance to the users. The reward function φJ2 gives
a better performance than the base case overall, but it penalizes less for being
near the jammer thus affecting its performance compared to φJ1 .
In Figure 4.10 we show the overall network SINR for all three rewards
as the jamming cost cj increases. We notice that the overall network SINR
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𝜙c =||q-O||-r
||q-O||
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Figure 4.11: The compound reward function φC .
increases with the increase in cj. This is the case since increasing cj decreases
the jamming power P ∗j exponentially, thus increasing the SINR. We note that
for lower values of cj, the jamming power is high and the reward functions
are able to provide better SINR values and up to 52.8% and 18.0% increase
for φJ1 and φ
J
2 respectively against the no reward at cj = 10
−6.
From Figures 4.9 and 4.10, we can clearly see that using the optimal
placement algorithm with φJ1 reward function outperforms both the φ
J
2 and
no reward cases.
4.4 Simultaneous Eavesdropping and Jamming
In this section, we consider the case in which both an eavesdropping region
and a jammer are present simultaneously in the network. We maintain the
same assumptions about the attackers as in the previous sections. In this
scenario, the purpose of the network operator is to deploy the SCBSs so as to
maximize the uplink SINR of secure users. The jammer’s main purpose is to
deny the service of the network and not to disrupt the eavesdropping attack.
Therefore, to keep both attacks simultaneously effective and to eliminate the
jamming effect on the eavesdroppers, we assume that there is no conflict of
interest between the jammer and the eavesdroppers.
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Figure 4.12: The final positions of the SCBSs as given by the optimal
placement algorithm with and without the compound reward.
4.4.1 The Reward Function
Based on the previous simulations, we can see that, for the operator, an op-
timal strategy is to use the reward function φE1 against eavesdroppers and φ
J
1
against jammers. Accordingly, we construct the compound reward function
φC(q) = φE1 (q)× φJ1 (q) that combines both aspects of the reward functions.
φC(q) =

0 when ||q −O|| 6 r,
0 when ||q − j|| 6 R∗,
||q −O|| − r else.
(4.19)
Figure 4.11 shows a network attacked by eavesdroppers and a jammer with
the reward function φC .
4.4.2 Solution Approach and Simulations
Define X (B) as in (4.5) and (4.18), by
X (B) = −
n∑
i=1
∫
Vi(B)
||q − bi||2φC(q)ψ(q)dq. (4.20)
The problem to be solved by the network operator is to place the SCBSs to
maximize X (B) as given by (4.20). This is similar to the general problem
given in (4.1). To solve this problem, we use the optimal placement algorithm
57
25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Eavesdropping Radius (r)
O
ve
ra
ll S
IN
R 
of
 s
ec
ur
e 
us
er
s
 
 
φC reward
No reward
Figure 4.13: Overall SINR of secure users versus the eavesdropping radius.
as given by Algorithm 4.1.
Here, we once again consider a 500 m×500 m square network with uni-
formly distributed users in the presence of both a jammer and an eavesdrop-
ping region (as given in 4.2.4 and 4.3.4). To simulate a simultaneous attack,
we need to keep both the jamming and eavesdropping attacks effective. We
achieve this by placing the jammer far away from the eavesdroppers. This
renders the effect of jamming on the eavesdroppers negligible, and thus it
can be neglected. Accordingly, the analysis in 4.2.1 holds. The simulation
parameters are the same as those in 4.2.4 and 4.3.4 combined.
Figure 4.12 shows the final positions of the SCBSs as obtained by the
optimal placement algorithm with and without the compound reward in a
heterogeneous network attacked by a jammer and a set of eavesdroppers. On
the one hand, the algorithm with no reward, i.e. the nonsecure placement,
deploys one SCBS between the eavesdroppers and another one very close to
the jammer. On the other hand, the algorithm with the compound reward
penalized users for being near the eavesdropped area and the jammer (as
shown by the darker areas). Consequently, the proposed approach was able to
place the SCBSs away from the jammer and the eavesdroppers while keeping
a structure similar to the non-rewarded case, thus improving the overall
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Figure 4.14: Overall SINR of secure users versus the number of SCBSs.
network security.
Figure 4.13 shows that as the eavesdropping radius r increases, the overall
network SINR decreases for both with and without the reward function. This
is due to the fact that as the eavesdropping radius increases, the percentage
of secure users decreases. On the one hand, the no reward suffered from
dramatic decreases in the SINR while on the other hand, the reward function
was able to contain the damage and provide up to 197% improvement at
r = 250 m.
In Figure 4.14, we show the SINR of secure users as the number of SCBSs
increases. We notice that the overall SINR of secure users increases with the
increase in the number of SCBSs. This is due to the fact that the users are
becoming closer to their serving SCBS; thus, both the percentage of secure
users and their SINR increase. The reward function φC outperformed the no
reward case for all values of n and was able to provide a 42.3% increase in
the SINR at n = 3.
Figure 4.15 shows the overall SINR of secure users as a function of the
jamming cost. As the jamming cost increases, the jamming power decreases
and thus the network SINR increases. Again, the φC reward outperformed
the no reward case and was able to provide up to 75.1% better SINR when
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cj = 10
−6.
Clearly, Figures 4.13 through 4.15 show that the optimal placement al-
gorithm suffered from huge performance degradations under simultaneous
jamming and eavesdropping when used with no reward. When used with the
φC reward, it was able to provide significant improvements and, to a great
extent, overcome the damage of both eavesdropping and jamming.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we have investigated the potential security threats in emerging
wireless technologies. First, we have analyzed, using game theoretic tech-
niques, the interactions between SUs and eavesdroppers in a cognitive radio
network in the presence of multiple PUs. To this extent, we have formulated
a game between the SUs and eavesdroppers and analyzed its equilibrium as-
suming that the SUs have full information about the eavesdroppers. In the
proposed game, the objective of the SUs was to maximize their secrecy rates
while the objective of eavesdroppers was to minimize the overall secrecy rate
of the network by maximizing their eavesdropping capabilities. To solve this
game, we have introduced a novel secure channel selection algorithm that
enables the SUs and eavesdroppers to take distributed decisions that allow
them to reach the equilibrium of the game. Simulation results have shown
that the proposed approach yields significant improvements, in terms of the
average secrecy rate per SU, when compared to classical spectrum sharing
schemes.
Then, we have introduced a novel approach to study how the SUs can mit-
igate the effect of potential eavesdropping and secure their communications
with the base station in a cognitive radio network. The SUs must maintain a
threshold level of interference and must protect the PU receivers from their
transmissions. Accordingly, we proposed an appropriate utility function for
the SUs, and then formulated the problem as a generalized assignment prob-
lem. We studied the solution to this problem for three different scenarios
depending on the ability of the SUs to communicate and the availability of
the SU information at the base station. We introduced a centralized approach
and two decentralized approaches that can reach a solution. Simulation re-
sults show that the proposed decentralized algorithms were able to provide
near-optimal performances with much less information.
Finally, we have studied the problem of optimal placement of SCBSs in
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adversarial heterogeneous wireless networks. We considered the following
three types of attacks: jamming, eavesdropping and simultaneous jamming
and eavesdropping. For each scenario, we equipped each user with the appro-
priate utility, and then formulated each attack scenario as an optimization
problem. Using the proposed optimal placement algorithm, we reached at the
optimal locations. Simulation results have shown that the proposed approach
yields significant improvements in terms of the overall network performance
when compared to classical placement techniques.
5.1 Future Work
For cognitive radio networks, future work can consider jamming attacks
in cognitive radio networks and how the SUs can evade them given com-
plete/partial knowledge of attackers. For small cells, future work can con-
sider other attack scenarios, such as multiple eavesdropping and jamming.
In addition, other aspects of the problem can be studied such as increasing
the network coverage, and adding constraints to the optimization such as a
minimum interference and maximum transmission radius.
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